+ *Of the per-year inputs above, only D&A as a share of revenue moves across the forecast: it steps down each year as the acquired-intangible amortisation from the Slack and Informatica transactions rolls off. Capital expenditure, the change in net working capital and the effective tax rate are held flat at the values shown, so the single Base figure applies to every forecast year for those rows. Th

+ | D&A / Revenue — Year 1, stepping down each year to Year 5 | unchanged | 8.0% | unchanged |

+ The price target is sensitive to both the discount rate and the terminal growth rate, and the grid below isolates the perpetuity-growth terminal leg — varying WACC and terminal growth affects only the perpetuity terminal value. Because the selected terminal method **is** pure perpetuity growth, the bolded central cell of this grid is not merely a component but the reported base case itself: at the

+ | Cash Conversion Cycle | -178 days | 47 days | -56 days | -24 days |

+ **The row that does matter is CapEx/Revenue, and it exposes the deepest non-comparability in the peer set.** Salesforce is genuinely asset-light — its capex is a tiny fraction of revenue — while Oracle Corporation is spending well over a third of revenue building owned AI infrastructure (with Microsoft Corporation, whose working-capital metrics are omitted from this table because it is the only na

+ *Basis note: the current P/E is struck on **reported** GAAP EPS, while the target P/E is applied to **normalised** EPS (stripped of the reversible strategic-investment mark and taxed at the normalised rate) — so the two columns of that row are not on the same earnings base, and the current multiple looks lower than it would on the normalised figure. The EV/EBITDA row is on one consistent basis: bo